

Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----119521 111842Z /42
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4112
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 01126

EXDIS (HANDLE AS NODIS)

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, IS, EG, US
SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR JERUSALEM MEETINGS

REF: (A) STATE 5218, (B) STATE 6679

SUMMARY: FOUND SADAT IN A DISPIRITED MOOD AS RESULT
SEVERAL THINGS, INCLUDING MEETING WITH WEIZMAN WHICH HAD
JUST CONCLUDED AND KAMEL'S REPORT ON DAYAN'S COUNTER
PROPOSALS FOR AGENDA. AFTER LENGTHY DISCUSSION ABOUT
DAYAN COUNTER PROPOSALS RE AGENDA, INCLUDING MY READING
FULL TEXT OF DAYAN'S LETTER TO HIM, SADAT SAID HE DID
NOT SEE HOW EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI VIEWS COULD BE
RECONCILED. I, THEREFORE, TRIED OUT ON HIM USG THREE-
POINT PROPOSAL FOR AGENDA AND DISCUSSED WHAT WOULD BE
NECESSARY TO MAKE IT WORK. SADAT LIKED OUR THREE-POINT
AGENDA AND ACCEPTS IT IF ISRAELIS AGREE. HE ALSO AGREED
ACCEPT OUR PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS ON HOW JERUSALEM MEETINGS
MIGHT EVOLVE AND PROMISED INSTRUCT KAMEL SHOW FLEXIBILITY.
END SUMMARY.

1. MET WITH SADAT FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF TODAY IN ASWAN.
VP MUBARAK WAS ALSO PRESENT. I FOUND SADAT IN A
DISPIRITED MOOD AS RESULT OF SEVERAL THINGS: (A) A
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DISCOURAGING MEETING WITH WEIZMAN WHICH HE HAD JUST HAD
(SEPTTEL); (B) VP MUBARAK HAD SHOWN SADAT TEXT OF BEGIN
STATEMENT (TEL AVIV 391), WHICH SADAT FOUND "TOTALLY
UNACCEPTABLE TO US"; (C) KAMEL HAD SENT A REPORT ON THE
DAYAN COUNTER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA, WHICH SADAT
CONSIDERED NEGATIVE; AND (D) HE HAD HEARD OF ALLEGED
DAYAN STATEMENT IN ITALY SUGGESTING IT WOULD BE

IMPOSSIBLE REACH AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA PRIOR TO JERUSALEM MEETING AND MEETING WOULD HAVE TO CONVENE WITHOUT ONE. NONE OF THIS, AS SADAT SAW IT, AUGURED WELL FOR THE UPCOMING JERUSALEM MEETING. THE ISRAELIS, HE REPEATEDLY STATED, HAVE NOT YET UNDERSTOOD THE NEW SPIRIT WHICH HE HAD HOPED TO BRING ABOUT THROUGH HIS TRIP TO JERUSALEM.

2. DAYAN COUNTER PROPOSALS RE AGENDA: AFTER WE HAD DISCUSSED THE BEGIN STATEMENT (SEPTTEL), I ASKED IF HE HAD YET HAD A CHANCE TO STUDY THE DAYAN COUNTER PROPOSALS FOR THE AGENDA. HE HAD KAMEL'S ARABIC SUMMARY BEFORE HIM AND CLEARLY DID NOT LIKE ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THERE WERE GREAT MANY POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI PROPOSALS, AND IN LIGHT HIS JUST CONCLUDED MEETING WITH WEIZMAN IN WHICH THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE HAD FIGURED PROMINENTLY, EXPRESSED GRAVE DOUBT THAT THE TWO SIDES COULD RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES. I, THEREFORE, THOUGHT IT BEST TO READ TO HIM THE ENTIRE TEXT OF DAYAN'S LETTER, INCLUDING THE FIVE-POINT ISRAELI PROPOSAL, SO THAT THERE COULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING.

3. SADAT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY, BUT FULL TEXT FAILED PLEASE HIM ANY MORE THAN HAD KAMEL'S SUMMARY. SADAT CLAIMED THAT AT ISMAILIA BEGIN HAD AGREED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY MIGHT BE CITED AND EXPRESSED
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SURPRISE THAT DAYAN SHOULD NOW BE WITHDRAWING THAT PRINCIPLE. HE ALSO STRONGLY DISPUTED DAYAN'S CLAIM THAT AT ISMAILIA, HE, SADAT, HAD ACCEPTED ISRAELI RESERVATION ON TERMINATION OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE 1967. HE INSISTED BEGIN HAD MADE HIS POINT AND HE, SADAT, HAD PRESENTED THE EGYPTIAN VIEW. THEY HAD AGREED TO DIFFER, BUT IT WAS UTTERLY WRONG TO SUGGEST THAT SADAT HAD ACCEPTED THE ISRAELI POSITION. THE ISRAELI FORMULATION RE PALESTINIAN ARABS RESIDING IN JUDEA, SAMARIA AND THE GAZA DISTRICT, SADAT SAID, IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

4. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW THESE OUTSTANDING ISSUES, ALONG WITH THE MATTER OF THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, COULD BE RESOLVED. WITH THIS KIND OF ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS, HE FEARED THAT THE JERUSALEM POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING WILL GET NOWHERE. HE DID NOT SEE HOW THE IMPASSE COULD BE BROKEN. WE WENT ROUND AND ROUND ON THIS MATTER FOR TWENTY-FIVE MINUTES WITH SADAT BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISCOURAGED.

5. U.S. AGENDA PROPOSAL: SINCE SADAT'S REACTION WAS

TOTALLY NEGATIVE AND PROSPECTS OF EXPEDITIOUSLY RECONCILING THE TWO SIDES' VIEWS WERE IN MY VIEW DIM, I SAID I HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT SOME IDEAS OF OUR OWN TO HIM FOR HIS CONSIDERATION. DRAWING ON REFTELS, I TOLD HIM WE HAD STUDIED BOTH SIDES' SUGGESTIONS FOR AGENDA AND HAD NOTED THE SOMEWHAT DIVERGENT VIEWS OF THE TWO SIDES. IT SEEMED TO US THAT DISCUSSIONS ON THE AGENDA SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DELAY MORE IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. WE THINK IT DESIRABLE TO TRY TO REACH

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AGREEMENT BEFORE THE MEETING ON THE AGENDA AND HAVE EXTRACTED A NUMBER OF COMMON ELEMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES' SUGGESTIONS. IF BOTH SIDES WILL AGREE, FOR PURPOSE OF AGENDA, SUBJECTS FOR NEGOTIATION SHOULD BE STATED IN PURELY FACTUAL MANNER. PHRASEOLOGY THAT IS SIMPLY A RED FLAG IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER SIDE AND PREJUDICES POSITIONS SHOULD BE AVOIDED. WITH THIS THOUGHT IN MIND, WE HAD COME UP WITH A THREE-POINT AGENDA WHICH WE WISHED TO TRY OUT ON HIM. I THEN GAVE HIM THE THREE POINTS.

6. IN GIVING HIM OUR AGENDA, I EMPHASIZED OUR VIEW THAT ANY PROLONGED NEGOTIATION OVER WORDING OF AGENDA IS STERILE. WE BELIEVE OUR THREE POINTS REPRESENT REASONABLE BASIS TO PROCEED AND ARE ACCURATE REFLECTION OF WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE SECRETARY DERIVED FROM RECENT TALKS WITH AREA LEADERS AS TO WHAT THE JERUSALEM TALKS SHOULD TRY TO ACCOMPLISH. THEY FULLY PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

7. I NOTED THAT WE THINK IT IS CONSISTENT WITH VIEW OF BOTH SIDES THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. THIS OUGHT TO HAVE FIRST PRIORITY AS DESIRABLE OBJECTIVE FOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO WORK TOWARD. IF

MEANINGFUL DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS TO BE REACHED,
IT WILL NECESSITATE DISCUSSION IN SPECIFIC TERMS AND SOME
NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES ON PALESTINIAN/WEST BANK/GAZA
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PROBLEM. THUS, ITEMS ONE AND TWO OF OUR PROPOSED AGENDA
MIGHT BE CONSIDERED CONCURRENTLY. DISCUSSION OF PALES-
TINIAN PROBLEM SHOULD BE IN DETAILED AND SPECIFIC TERMS
AND MIGHT BEST BE DELEGATED, AT LEAST AT BEGINNING, TO A
SUB-COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

8. I EMPHASIZED TO SADAT AND MUBARAK THAT THE EGYPTIAN
SIDE, IF IT HOPES TO MAKE PROGRESS, SHOULD NOT SIMPLY TALK
IN TERMS OF GENERALITIES. ISRAEL NEEDS TO MAKE SOME
DIFFICULT DECISIONS ON PALESTINIAN QUESTION. THESE CAN
ONLY COME ABOUT THROUGH DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS
OF A PLAN WHICH CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT ISRAELI SECURITY
CONCERNS CAN BE MET. OUR RECOMMENDATION TO EGYPTIAN SIDE
IS THAT IT COME TO JERUSALEM WITH ITS OWN CONCRETE IDEAS
ON MOVING TOWARD A SOLUTION FOR WEST BANK AND GAZA. THERE
SHOULD BE COMPARABLE SPECIFICITY IN THE EGYPTIAN PLAN TO
THAT CONTAINED IN BEGIN PLAN. I SUGGESTED BEGIN PLAN
MIGHT BE A GOOD STARTING POINT. EGYPTIANS COULD POINT
OUT THOSE ITEMS WITH WHICH THEY CAN AGREE AS WELL AS
THOSE ON WHICH THEY WISH MAKE COUNTER PROPOSALS. A USEFUL
EARLY OBJECTIVE MIGHT ALSO BE TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF
GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENT ON WEST BANK/GAZA
WHICH WOULD DESCRIBE THE MAIN ELEMENTS IN A PROCESS FOR
DEALING WITH PALESTINIAN QUESTION IN AN INTERIM PERIOD
COVERING NEXT FIVE YEARS, BUT WITHOUT THE DETAIL OF THE
BEGIN PLAN.

9. I TOLD SADAT THAT THE SECRETARY PLANS TO SPEND TWO
FULL DAYS IN JERUSALEM TALKS AND WOULD BE WILLING SPEND
A THIRD DAY IF DISCUSSIONS MAKE THIS WORTHWHILE.
SECRETARY'S PURPOSE WILL BE ASSIST BOTH SIDES TO GET
TALKS GOING ALONG MOST CONSTRUCTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE LINES.
IN INITIAL PERIOD IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOCUS TALKS ON
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TWO SUBJECTS: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
FOR NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR WEST BANK AND GAZA OVER
NEXT FIVE YEARS. ALSO INFORMED SADAT THAT SECRETARY WILL
BE BRINGING TO THE TALKS SOME CONCRETE FORMULATIONS IN
BOTH AREAS AND WE HOPE BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ISRAELIS
WILL ALSO COME WITH A RANGE OF POSSIBLE FORMULATIONS.

FINALLY, I MADE A POINT OF IMPRESSING ON SADAT THE NEED TO BRIEF KAMEL THOROUGHLY BEFORE LATTER'S DEPARTURE TO TRY TO IMBUE FONMIN WITH SADAT'S MORE FLEXIBLE AND CREATIVE APPROACH.

10. SADAT REPEATEDLY NODDED AGREEMENT AS I WAS MAKING THE POINTS. HE AND MUBARAK THEN STUDIED OUR THREE-POINT AGENDA CLOSELY. SADAT SAID HE LIKED IT AND CALLED IT, "VERY REASONABLE." HE NOTED THAT WE HAD IN SOME INSTANCES TAKEN THE GENERAL LANGUAGE OF U.N. RESOLUTION 242. HE AGREED THAT OUR AGENDA AVOIDS CONTENTIOUS PHRASEOLOGY, YET PERMITS BOTH SIDES TO LAY THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE ON ANY SUBJECT PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

11. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION BETWEEN SADAT AND MUBARAK, SADAT SAID HE ACCEPTS OUR AGENDA IF THE ISRAELIS DO. HE HOPED THAT THEY WILL. IT SHOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ENABLING THE PARTICIPANTS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE JERUSALEM TALKS AND WITHOUT FURTHER USELESS DEBATE ABOUT AGENDAS. HE INSTRUCTED MUBARAK TO INFORM KAMEL ON OUR RETURN FROM ASWAN. I TOLD HIM THAT, IF HE AGREED, I WOULD ALSO CALL ON KAMEL TOMORROW TO GIVE HIM OUR PROPOSED AGENDA. SADAT AGREED AND ALSO PROMISED TO BRIEF KAMEL PRIOR TO LATTER'S DEPARTURE. KAMEL WOULD BE INSTRUCTED BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE, BUT SADAT NOTED THERE ARE SOME MATTERS WHICH WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO HIM. HE ALSO AGREED WITH OUR

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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 CAIRO 01126
EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS
TO GIVE HIM OUR PROPOSED AGENDA. SADAT AGREED AND ALSO
PROMISED TO BRIEF KAMEL PRIOR TO LATTER'S DEPARTURE.
KAMEL WOULD BE INSTRUCTED BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE,
BUT SADAT NOTED THERE ARE SOME MATTERS WHICH WILL SIMPLY
HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO HIM. HE ALSO AGREED WITH OUR

PROCEDURAL SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHAT THE INITIAL SESSIONS
MIGHT FOCUS ON.

12. BY THE TIME I LEFT, SADAT WAS IN A SOMEWHAT BETTER
MOOD, BUT STILL DEPRESSED. SHORTLY BEFORE WE LEFT, HE
COMMENTED RATHER TIREDLY THAT HE WOULD PERHAPS BEFORE LONG
DROP ANOTHER BOMBSHELL ON ALL OF US BY TURNING OVER PRESI-
DENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO VP MUBARAK AND RETIRE TO
MIT ABUL-KOM. BOTH MUBARAK AND I URGED THAT HE NOT EVEN
CONSIDER LEAVING UNTIL PEACE ACHIEVED. SADAT SIMPLY
SAID, "WE WILL SEE." EILTS

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Message Attributes

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TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, IS, EG, US, XF, (SADAT, ANWAR)
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